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Thursday, May 14, 2009

Over-the-counter derivatives to be regulated

Treasury's OTC plan is broadly welcomed

By Aline van Duyn, Henny Sender and Francesco Guerrera in,New York

Published: May 14 2009 03:00 | Last updated: May 14 2009 03:00

The proposed regulatory overhaul of the multi-trillion dollar derivatives industry is expected to vastly increase the amount of information available to regulators around the world and could increase the cost of trading and taking on positions.

Industry experts said the proposals unveiled by Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary, and other US officials could address some of the shortcomings which left many of the excesses of the credit bubble undetected and allowed huge amounts of leverage to build up, in part through the use of derivatives. "This seems to be going in the right direction," said Joel Telpner, partner at Mayer Brown. "It seems to be addressing one of the biggest concerns about the industry, the lack of transparency and not enough information about who's trading."

In the announcement yesterday, the US Treasury specifically mentioned AIG, the insurance giant which had to be bailed out by the US government due to its credit default swap exposures. The huge exposures to an AIG default by other big derivatives dealers had created such large counterparty risks that the entire financial system was at risk.

"As the AIG situation has made clear, massive risks in derivatives markets have gone undetected by both regulators and market participants. But even if those risks had been better known, regulators lacked the proper authorities to mount an effective policy response," the Treasury said.

But while backing regulators' sentiments, some dealers voiced apprehension that if the measures are not implemented in the right way, the effect might well be to add to counterparty risk.

Dealers usually try to offset their positions with each other. But if some trades go through new clearing houses and others do not, a dealer could actually be magnifying the risks in the system.

Experts are also divided on the extent to which these measures will affect the profitability of the derivatives markets. In the past, precisely because these markets were so opaque, they gave rise to all kinds of lucrative price disparities. But as more derivatives became standardised, they became less profitable in any case.

"As long as dealers are still allowed to do customised derivatives with clients, they can still make money," says Leslie Rahl, president of Capital Markets Risk Advisors.

Mr Telpner said the details of the plan would be closely watched. For example, he said it would be crucial to find out what derivatives would be moved to full exchange trading and exactly which derivatives users would be subject to new rules.

Money market rates fall to pre-Lehman levels

By David Oakley and Ed Hammond

Published: May 13 2009 12:16 | Last updated: May 13 2009 19:03

Credit risk – measured by key money market spreads – has for the first time fallen below levels last seen before the collapse of Lehman Brothers as banks increasingly lend to each other amid growing confidence that the worst of the financial crisis is over.

The gap between London interbank offered rates and overnight market rates – a pure measure of credit risk – on Wednesday dropped below levels on Friday September 12, the last price before the US investment bank collapsed on the following Monday.

This spread is the most important gauge of risk in the money markets because it measures the difference between risk-free overnight market rates and three-month Libor, the key benchmark interest rate banks charge each other for lending.

The narrowing of this spread suggests fears of a financial meltdown – prevalent after the US investment bank went bankrupt – have sharply receded.

Don Smith, economist at interdealer broker Icap, said: “We don’t think the system is about to break down any more, and confidence is certainly coming back. But it is still only a trickle. We are in much better shape than in the aftermath of Lehman as more banks and institutions are willing to lend, but activity is still much lower than last summer.”

However, some analysts cautioned that money markets had been boosted by the powerful rally in equities – and equities may be due a correction.

Willem Sels, head of credit strategy at Dresdner Kleinwort, said: “The equity rally is because the economy and company results are not deteriorating as badly as they were. We need signs of positive growth on both these fronts before we can get too optimistic.”

The so-called overnight index swap spread fell to 68.5 basis points on Wednesday for lending in dollars over three months and 60.5bp for lending in euros.

This measures the spread that three-month Libor trades above a three-month average of overnight market rates. These spreads stood at 86.3bp and 63.4bp respectively on September 12.

The sterling spread is still higher than pre-Lehman, although it has also narrowed sharply in recent weeks. It now stands at 96.7bp. Three-month dollar Libor rates fell to 0.883 per cent on Wednesday, euro Libor dropped to 1.271 per cent and sterling Libor fell to 1.383 per cent.

This compares with October when dollar Libor touched highs of 4.818 per cent, euro Libor hit 5.399 per cent and sterling Libor rose to 6.285 per cent.

Growing convictions that the worst of the global recession is over have also been reflected in other important indicators, such as Vix, known as the Wall Street fear gauge, and credit default swaps.

Vix, which measures volatility on the S&P 500, traded at 33 on Wednesday – its lowest level since September 25, having peaked at 80 in November. Lower volatility is a sign of increasing stability in markets.

The iTraxx Crossover, which measures the risk of bond defaults among high-yield companies in Europe, has also rallied sharply in recent weeks. The index has dropped to 810bp from highs of 1,150bp in early March.


Relationship: economic data and US Dollars

By John Authers, Investment Editor

Published: May 13 2009 18:40 | Last updated: May 13 2009 18:40

Investors have had a reminder this week that sometimes economic numbers can come out worse than expected.

For two months, severe pessimism created low expectations that were regularly beaten by the data. Now we are having negative surprises again, and the response is a correction to the rally of the past two months.

On Wednesday, we learnt that US retail sales fell last month. They were not supposed to do that. On Monday, Chinese exports were revealed to have barely risen in April. They are running at about the same level that was typical in late 2006. Again, they were supposed to bounce back rather more than that.

The dynamic between Chinese producers and US consumers is central to the world economy. So indications that it was not reviving as fast as expected were enough to push share prices down sharply. This week, the FTSE All-World index is down 3.9 per cent, while the S&P 500 and FTSE-Eurofirst 300 are down somewhat more – a correction that leaves most of the rally’s gains intact.

The bad data also helped the dollar. It still strengthens when risk aversion rises – in credit or equity markets – and weakens when risk appetite returns, continuing a perverse correlation from last year.

This data does not imperil the thesis that drove the rally. That thesis was that it was no longer necessary to factor in a risk of the “nightmare scenarios” of an all-out financial meltdown and an ensuing second Great Depression. Prices in March incorporated a significant risk of these scenarios, so a rally could be justified from there.

The latest data continues to show that the “free fall” for the global economy has ended. But it also shows that hopes of a swift recovery are unduly optimistic. The market plainly finds this disconcerting. That shows that sentiment, after more two months of rallying, was ahead of itself.

Fed wrestling


Published: May 13 2009 09:35 | Last updated: May 13 2009 20:56

Ever tried wrestling with a giant pile of jello? That must be what it feels like for US monetary policymakers these days. One of the criticisms of ex-Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan’s view that central banks should not target asset prices directly, but focus instead on growth and inflation, is that a strategy of mopping up when bubbles have burst can be not only prohibitively costly, but also highly uncertain.

Indeed the Fed’s grip on interest rates is slipping. Since the beginning of March, yields on 10-year govern- ment bonds had risen by some 20 basis points, before Wednesday’s poor retail sales numbers lifted bond prices. In a normal recession that would be something to celebrate: higher yields can reflect renewed economic confidence. But this is not what the Fed wants. It began quantitative easing in mid-March with the explicit goal of getting borrowing costs down. Nor is it what President Obama seeks. His administration is committed to helping homeowners, and wants up to 5m for refinancing.

To be fair, the Fed has managed to drive mortgage rates below 5 per cent by buying about $100bn of mortgage backed securities a month. But, while refinancings now account for three- quarters of applications – versus about 50 per cent at the top of the housing boom – the surge in volume of applications is tailing off. In the last week of May, the four-week moving average of the number of refinancings fell 7 per cent, according to the Mortgage Bankers Association.

One problem is that, while 70 per cent of 30-year mortgages by out- standing value would benefit from refinancing, FTN Financial calculates, banks are unwilling to re-engage with borrowers. They only see risks: unem- ployment is rising, as is negative equity, while home foreclosures hit an all-time high in April. Even when the Fed does land a monetary punch, this wobbly recession is proving very hard to tame.

FT Editorial- UK economy


Published: May 13 2009 09:34 | Last updated: May 13 2009 20:59

We simply don’t know, neither do our models; everything is all over the place. That was the unsettling message of the Bank of England’slatest prognosis for the British economy. It could just as well still be shrinking next year and the year after – or not. Much the same is true of inflation, where there are “significant risks in each direction”.

As for commercial banks, they may now have enough capital – or not. All that the Bank was clear about during Wednesday’s release of its quarterly inflation report was that the recovery will be slow. Not much there for botanists, in other words. UK stocks fell, bond prices rose and sterling weakened on the prospect that interest rates will stay near zero.

Mervyn King, the governor, was as circumspect about the effects of quan- titative easing. Buying government bonds with newly printed money may have helped keep bond yields low – or not. It is impossible to know what would have happened otherwise. Arguably, bond yields would be lower today if the Bank had not used QE. After all, money printing is usually a strong signal to sell bonds. Mr King, addressing such fears, was mildly reassuring when he said the Bank would “try to keep” inflation close to its 2 per cent target.

Still, one promising sign is the continued fall in interbank lending rates. That shows banks, at least, are willing to lend to each other. But it says little about bank lending to the real economy.

Average lending rates to non-financial companies dropped from December by more than a percentage point to about 2.5 per cent. But that easier credit may now only be available, as the Bank notes, to low-risk big companies. Less bankable smaller companies may still be shut out. Ultra low interest rates, and the potentially inflationary finance of QE, have done little to help their lot.

BACKGROUND NEWS

The BoE said the UK economy faced a slow recovery and inflation would probably stay below its 2 per cent target for the next three years as the country struggles to escape recession.

The economy would contract on an annual basis for the rest of this year before growth resumes in 2010, the central bank’s quarterly forecasts showed on Wednesday.

However, Mr King stressed the wide range of possible outcomes for the economy, saying that they were “extraordinarily difficult” to judge.

This has not been a pure failure of markets

The argument that we have witnessed a pure market failure fails the most elementary tests. Financial institutions and markets operate within the macroeconomic, regulatory and political framework created and maintained by public bodies. It is not difficult to point to the serious deficiencies of this framework that contributed to the present crisis.

Analytically-based lessons from the present crisis should focus on revisions of the macroeconomic and regulatory frameworks for financial markets that would reduce the risks of dangerous booms and busts. 

By Leszek Balcerowicz

Published: May 14 2009 03:00 | Last updated: May 14 2009 03:00

Only the rulers of Cuba, Venezuela and Iran and some -ideologues in the west condemn capitalism. Empirically-minded people know there is no good alternative. However, capitalism takes many forms and evolves. The questions to ask, then, are: "What capitalism?" and "Does the present crisis shed new light on this issue?"

The popular condemnations of "greed" in response to the crisis seem to me superficial. Economists are expected to explain human behaviour in terms of situational factors and not to compete with preachers and politicians. Equally unconvincing is the speculation about what John Maynard Keynes would be saying were he alive.

As a preliminary step to a more productive analysis, let us recall that not long ago Japan Inc, the Rhineland model and other statist or corporatist varieties of capitalism were praised as a better alternative to the more -market-oriented Anglo-Saxon variant of this system. Since then, based on solid empirical research, there has been a wave of deregulation. Faced with high structural unemployment, fiscal pressures and ageing societies, many western economies have started to reform their overextended welfare states. China and India have accelerated their growth thanks to a reduction in the political control of their economies. Central and eastern European countries show that the more market reforms you accumulate, the faster is your longer-term growth.

The present crisis means we must take further measures to release entrepreneurial capitalism, offsetting declines in gross domestic product caused by the financial crisis and the legacy of attempts to manage it, especially the hugely increased public debt.

But is the financial sector an exception? Can the crisis be interpreted as a pure market failure, which requires more public intervention? It is easy to agree on the facts: increased leverage and asset bubbles in many economies, as well as serious errors made at the top of huge financial conglomerates. Symptoms, however, should not be confused with causes. The argument that we have witnessed a pure market failure fails the most elementary tests. Financial institutions and markets operate within the macroeconomic, regulatory and political framework created and maintained by public bodies. It is not difficult to point to the serious deficiencies of this framework that contributed to the present crisis.

There is scope for further analysis of the relative contributions of the US Federal Reserve's easy monetary policy in the early 2000s and the "savings glut" in some emerging economies. With a more restrictive Fed policy (and with more disciplined fiscal policy under George W. Bush, the former US president), there would have been initially slower growth but less increase in the savings glut later, a smaller build-up of financial imbalances and, as a result, less disruption to growth. Excess liquidity encouraged the spread of powerful short-term incentives in financial institutions. Those European Union economies that developed the most extreme housing bubbles - Britain, Ireland, Spain - stimulated demand for housing with tax breaks.

Analytically-based lessons from the present crisis should focus on revisions of the macroeconomic and regulatory frameworks for financial markets that would reduce the risks of dangerous booms and busts. Policies that contribute to the growth of huge financial conglomerates - which, once in crisis, endanger the stability of whole countries - should be eliminated.

These proposals have nothing to do with grandiose schemes for reinventing market capitalism. However, every crisis produces a shock to mass beliefs and thus may have policy consequences. There is a risk that empirically dubious but emotionally attractive interpretations, which call for more statism, could gain ground.

Mises, Hayek, Schumpeter, Nozick and others have noted that under democratic capitalism there are always influential intellectuals who condemn capitalism and call for the state to restrain the markets. Such an activity bears no risk and may be very rewarding. (This contrasts strongly with the consequences of criticising socialism while living under socialism.)

Entrepreneurial capitalism has nowadays no serious external enemies; it can only be weakened from within. This should be regarded as a call to action - for those who believe that individuals' prosperity and dignity are best ensured under limited government.

The writer, a former Polish deputy prime minister and governor of the National Bank of Poland, is a professor at the Warsaw School of Economics

Exit strategies: UK unconventional economic policy needs co-ordination

 Over the past few years, falls in asset prices have left banks, businesses and households poorer than they thought they were. Debts have, therefore, been becoming a heftier burden. While the private sector is paying down its debts and tightening its belt, it will be a weak source of demand.

Without a serious commitment to fiscal rectitude and close co-operation between the financial regulator, the Bank and the Treasury, the UK risks wrecking its credibility.

Published: May 13 2009 20:12 | Last updated: May 13 2009 20:12

Wednesday was a withering day for green shoots. The latest quarterly Bank of England inflation report downgraded its growth expectations and lifted its inflation forecasts. Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, went to great pains to stress how little we know about where we are. Amid all this uncertainty, one thing is certain: the authorities must work together on their recession-exit strategies.

As Mr King said, this is not a typical 20th-century postwar recession; it is rooted in the UK’s crisis-shredded balance sheets. Over the past few years, falls in asset prices have left banks, businesses and households poorer than they thought they were. Debts have, therefore, been becoming a heftier burden. While the private sector is paying down its debts and tightening its belt, it will be a weak source of demand.

The authorities have familiar problems to face. For example, when is it time to withdraw policy support? Tighten too rapidly, and they will trample any green shoots. Too slowly, and they will nurture an unsustainable blossoming. But the strange character of this recession and the policies deployed to defeat it means there are new aspects to the problem of how to withdraw anti-crisis policies without sacrificing credibility.

Demand has been supported by loose fiscal and monetary policy. Given the dangers of falling prices, which would increase the debt burden further, aggression in preventing deflation has been particularly important. The banks have also been shored up with a recapitalisation programme and an array of state insurance schemes.

This is a topsy-turvy world where financial regulators are changing capital requirements to encourage lending to support macroeconomic goals. Fiscal policy has reprised its role as a tool of demand management while central banks buy more government debt to increase the money supply. The lines between financial, fiscal and monetary policy have become indistinct.

As John Gieve, former deputy governor of the Bank, has argued, there is a need for greater co-ordination between these policymakers. There is, in particular, a serious concern that fiscal policy and banking policy will be adjusted at a pace designed to suit politicians’ electoral timetables. If so, monetary policy would be the only economic lever still being operated with the economy in mind. Without a serious commitment to fiscal rectitude and close co-operation between the financial regulator, the Bank and the Treasury, the UK risks wrecking its credibility.

Discussion on "glut of savings": improving health coverage in China

Sickness of the savers

By Geoff Dyer

Published: May 12 2009 19:53 | Last updated: May 12 2009 19:53

A patient awaiting medical examination Beijing
Painful readjustment: waiting for the doctor in a Beijing hospital

 

China’s economy has turned the corner. Government banks have been lending at a rapid rate, factory output is rising again and the local stock market is blazing ahead. But just how quickly the world’s most populous country emerges from the global economic crisis will depend, in part, on places such as the cancer ward of Jingdong hospital in Sanhe, not far from Beijing, and how they treat patients like Cao Jun.

Aged 13, Jun was diagnosed a few months ago with leukaemia. His parents managed to get him into the hospital, a Sino-US joint venture, and have been impressed with the level of care. “The doctors and nurses have been very helpful and are doing everything they can to assist us,” says his father, Cao Jirui.

But Mr Cao now works in part-time jobs after losing his position in a factory and, with little money left, he knows his son will not be able to stay much longer. “My son’s disease is bleeding our family financially dry,” he says.

Patients who cannot afford to treat serious illness are an all too common feature of any developing country. But they are particularly important in China for two reasons. The failings of the healthcare system have become a large source of political discontent, the biggest blot on the Communist party’s claims to be substantially improving the welfare of ordinary Chinese. In addition, health insurance has become a central issue in the country’s immediate economic future. For all the signs that China is beginning to rebound, the government has only won half the battle. To return to rapid rates of expansion, the country will need to find new sources of growth to replace stagnant exports, and that means boosting consumption.

If the US economy stored up problems for itself through consuming too much, China has distorted its economy by saving too much and spending too little. In recent years, the savings rate has risen as high as 50 per cent of gross domestic product, including the retained earnings of state-owned companies, and even families with incomes of less than $200 a year still save 18 per cent of their income, according to the World Bank.

One of the main underlying causes is the weakness of the social safety net. Many Chinese put a large chunk of their wages into bank accounts because they are worried about pensions, education expenses and – most of all – the prospect of a big hospital bill if a family member falls seriously ill.

Last month the government announced reforms that promise a clinic in every village by the end of 2011 and by 2020 a universal health insurance system that is “safe, efficient, convenient and affordable”. The success of this plan could be crucial to China’s medium-term economic performance. “China will not establish a more consumer-based economy until there is a stronger health insurance system in place,” says He Fan, an economist at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Indeed, one of the ironies of the current crisis in global capitalism is that China’s recovery – which will have a large impact on how well the rest of the world economy performs over the next few years – partly depends on its success in implementing the western-style social welfare that industrialised countries themselves increasingly struggle to fund.

china-charts

At the same time, the failings of China’s health system are the dark side of the past three decades of economic reforms. Under Mao Zedong, improvements in healthcare were one of the main achievements. The strengths of the Maoist system are often exaggerated – the “barefoot doctors” sent out to work in villages were often barely educated and poorly prepared to provide medical treatment. But with the introduction of simple antibiotics and improvements in public hygiene, the results were impressive. Life expectancy rose from 35 in 1952 to 68 in 1982.

But in the 1980s – when China started reforming its economy – this system was in effect dismantled. Clinics on farm communes were often closed when land was redistributed. In the cities, state-owned companies and other public sector organisations started pulling out of providing healthcare. The government also put less focus on health spending, which fell from 3 per cent of GDP in the Mao era to below 2 per cent by the late 1990s.

China’s health indicators have continued to improve but at a slower pace than in many developing countries that have often not enjoyed such rapid economic growth. A recent World Bank study noted that “China has gone from being an overachiever to being an underachiever” in terms of health improvements.

Remarkably, China’s Communist government accounts for a smaller proportion of national health spending than in the US. The result has been to throw responsibility for healthcare on to patients, who pay for about 60 per cent of it. Relative to income, a stay in a hospital in China is more expensive than in any other big country.

Over the past few years, a string of government reports have outlined the problems. Researchers discovered that one-third of people who had been told to go to hospital failed to do so – and of those, three-quarters blamed the cost. In a 2005 report, the research arm of the State Council, the country’s cabinet, admitted that efforts to reform healthcare since the 1980s had been “basically a failure”.

China-numbers

Problems involve not just the level of funding but also the way the system is organised. Chinese hospitals suffer from the sort of unfettered capitalism that China has criticised so heavily in western banks. Under some estimates, as much as 40 per cent of revenues at hospitals come from profits from drug sales, to which doctors’ salaries are linked. As a result, there are huge incentives for doctors to overprescribe on expensive medicines and tests.

The government tries to control drug prices and hospital profit margins but hospitals find ways around the rules. Corruption in hospitals is also a problem, with patients complaining about the bribes they regularly need to pay.

The treatment Cao Jun has received reflects some of these problems. He first started experiencing severe fevers two years ago but the clinic in the rural area of Hebei province, where the family lives, gave him only simple medicines. “No one there had any idea that he could have such a serious disease,” says his father.

The family have a relative who is a party official in Hebei, through whom they were able to get Jun into the hospital near Beijing, but he cannot stay there forever. “We have been here for nearly a month and there is only so much we can ask of our relative,” says Cao Jirui. “When we go back home, I don’t know what we will do.”

The political and economic cost of these failings has not been lost on China’s leaders. Since they took office in 2003, President Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, prime minister, have talked frequently about improving healthcare, and recent months have brought a flurry of announcements about funding and reforms. After last year committing themselves to providing universal coverage for health insurance, last month they spelt out more concrete targets, promising to have 90 per cent of citizens covered by 2011 and everyone insured by 2020.

The health ministry is to introduce rules to try and prevent hospitals from making a profit on drug sales. In rural areas, a fixed salary scheme for doctors is being tried out, taking away the link between drug sales and their salaries.

There are also promises of big increases in funding. Spending by the central government on healthcare – which provides a part of the overall health budget – has been increasing by more than 20 per cent in recent years. In January, Mr Wen pledged Rmb850bn ($125bn, £81bn, €91bn) for healthcare reform over the next three years, although it is unclear how much of this will be money that would not already be in the budget – Tang Jun at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences says that 60 per cent will be new funds but Caijing, a business magazine, reported recently that little of the Rmb850bn will be new.

Big increases in spending would be good news for multinational pharmaceuticals companies, especially at a time when they are under intense pressure in the US. However, basic health insurance is likely to lean more towards generic versions of established drugs rather than more expensive new patented medicines. A large part of the extra funding will also go into building new hospitals and clinics.

For some health experts, these reforms amount to an ambitious and important scaling-up of public healthcare. They point out that the government has now committed to making health insurance a basic right.

“The announcements and substantial funding for reforms demonstrate strong political commitment,” says Sarah Barber, a researcher at the Beijing office of the World Health Organisation. “There are many pilots ongoing throughout the country and we will probably see major breakthroughs in some regions with sufficient human and financial resources.” But poorer regions will find it harder to make progress, she adds. Liu Guo’en, a management professor at Peking University, says it will be “a long process” but adds: “It is a big step forward for China.”

Many Chinese economists and health experts are unconvinced, however, that the latest reforms will have any immediate impact on savings habits and on spurring a shift to more consumption.

For a start, coverage under the insurance plans is limited – for rural residents, it will be Rmb120 a year, compared with an average in-patient hospital bill of Rmb4,000. Most local governments provide additional subsidies, especially for serious illness, but patients usually end up with substantial bills. Researchers at Tokyo University, who examined the pilot programmes for rural health insurance, found the impact on health expenditures by individuals only modest.

A drawback of the current system – that patients need to pay the hospital up front in cash, being reimbursed only later – will still be in place. That means even insured patients will still need a pot of savings to cover bills.

A shopper looks at imported shoe, Beijing
Health insurance reforms could aid the development of a consumer-based economy, persuading shoppers in the capital and elsewhere to save less and spend more

“I do not think the recently announced measures will have significant impacts on people’s saving and consumption decisions,” says Xu Xiaonian, an economist at China Europe International Business School in Shanghai. “The so-called reforms are not really changes to the current system but window-dressing.”

Moreover, can China afford big new increases in spending? The central government is in a strong financial position but more than half the new money is expected to come from local and regional authorities, which are already are under heavy budgetary pressure from the slowing economy and have little room to borrow.

“The good thing about this plan is they have established the aim of covering all people,” says Mr Tang at the social sciences academy. “But people will still face heavy pressure from healthcare costs.” The urge to save is likely to recede but will not disappear overnight.

 

THE DIY DIALYSIS CLINIC: ‘WE HAD SPENT ALL OUR MONEY – WHAT ELSE COULD I DO?’

Desperate people seek desperate remedies. The site of the latest scandal to expose the problems in China’s health system is a shabby building that looks on to a dilapidated courtyard in a village on the outskirts of Beijing. For the past few years, this has been a makeshift and unlicensed kidney dialysis clinic.

The 17 people who used the clinic all faced the same situation: their basic health insurance did not come close to covering the cost of their dialysis treatment. So they clubbed together, bought some second-hand equipment and, following advice from friends and acquaintances, treated themselves.

Sun Yongqin, a 28-year-old from a rural area of Shanxi province in northern China, started suffering serious kidney problems in 2006. She needed dialysis three times a week but the local government health insurance programme covered only a small portion of the Rmb400 ($59, €43, £38) cost per treatment.

“These were huge sums of money not covered by the insurance,” she says. “My husband and I borrowed money from friends and relatives, but after a few months we had spent all our savings.”

She came to the makeshift clinic in Tongzhou, which charged only what was needed to keep it going, in late 2006 and was appalled at first by the dirty conditions. “But I was dying, so what else could I do?”

The clinic eventually attracted the attention of local health officials and this year it was closed down on safety grounds. Ten of the group are still living in the village but the dialysis machinery has been taken away.

Not all the patients are that upset. Wu Yan, a 35-year-old, says the health system in her husband’s home town in Hubei province has improved a lot in recent years, the result of increased funding. The couple are applying for insurance offered to low-wage families who are registered urban residents.

“If we get that, I will be able to do dialysis twice a week for free, which is good enough,” she says.

But outside the cities, the coverage is much less extensive. Ms Sun, who is a registered resident in a rural area of Shanxi province, says she was given 11 free treatments by the Tongzhou authorities when they closed the clinic, but now that they have finished she has been told to go back home and ask for treatment there.

“In my home town, they will pay for only half the treatment cost and that does not cover medicines,” she says. “I do not know what I am going to do next.”

US health reform’s long road ahead

Insurance companies are especially nervous about the creation of a government-backed health coverage plan that would be available to all as an alternative to private insurance. They fear, and rightly, that this would displace their own products and squeeze them out of healthcare.

Published: May 13 2009 20:09 | Last updated: May 13 2009 20:09

This week Barack Obama announced a compact with US healthcare suppliers: hospitals, pharmaceutical and insurance companies and other interested parties. They promised to reduce the growth of healthcare costs by $2,000bn over the next decade. It was a “historic day, a watershed event”, said the president, a first step on the road to comprehensive healthcare reform.

Although not without political significance, the announcement was far less than the breakthrough Mr Obama claimed. That impressive-seeming reduction in costs is no more than an aspiration. None of the parties is formally committed to any part of it, and there is no mechanism for enforcement or accountability. Incentives within the system are unchanged and will continue to push costs up. Declarations of this kind have been made many times.

But although it was no watershed event, it was not a non-event either. The announcement signalled willingness, if not eagerness, on the part of the US healthcare industry to engage itself in the Obama administration’s efforts at reform. Rather than seeking to stop the effort cold, the strategy that was successfully used against the Clinton administration’s proposals, providers want the place at the drawing board that Mr Obama has offered them. They are acknowledging he is serious, and that this time something is really going to happen. The question is: what?

Unbridgeable differences remain on crucial questions. Insurance companies are especially nervous about the creation of a government-backed health coverage plan that would be available to all as an alternative to private insurance. They fear, and rightly, that this would displace their own products and squeeze them out of healthcare. Many Democrats, of course, regard that prospect with delight: if things worked out that way, it would be “single payer” by stealth.

As for cost control under anything like the present structure, the question is: how? Explicit rationing is political poison, and doctors and hospitals are already resisting subtler efforts to economise. To sense the scale of the problem, note that if the $2,000bn in cost reductions were somehow achieved, it would reduce growth in US health spending from about 7 per cent a year to about 5.5 per cent. Spending on health, currently in the neighbourhood of 16 per cent of US gross domestic product, would still grow as a share of the economy. Getting a grip on this requires a radical plan that the administration has yet to disclose and which the healthcare industry, despite this week’s watershed event, is certain to oppose.

Geithner sees signs financial system is 'starting to heal'

Mr Geithner pointed to a drop in spreads for corporate bonds, lower risk premiums in interbank markets and cheaper default insurance on the biggest banks as evidence that fear in the financial system was abating. "These are all welcome signs, but the process of financial recovery and repair is going to take time."

Geithner sees signs financial system is 'starting to heal'

By Sarah O'Connor in Washington

Published: May 14 2009 03:00 | Last updated: May 14 2009 03:00

Tim Geithner, US Treasury secretary, said yesterday that "the financial system is starting to heal" as he pledged to recycle returned bank bail-out funds into small community banks.

Citing improving lending conditions, easing concerns about systemic risk and lower leverage at banks, Mr Geithner said "a substantial part of the adjustment process" for the financial sector was now over.

As some larger banks become confident enough to repay funds from the government's troubled asset relief programme, the Treasury will recycle that money into smaller banks with under $500m (€366m, £329m) in assets, Mr Geithner said. They will have six more months to apply for funds and the Treasury will also increase the amount of money they can access from 3 per cent of risk-weighted assets to 5 per cent.

"As in any financial crisis, the damage has been unfair and indiscriminate," said Mr Geithner in a speech to community bankers. "Ordinary Americans, small business owners and community banks who did the right thing and played by the rules are suffering from the actions of those who took on too much risk."

More than 90 per cent of the US's 8,300 banks are small or mid-sized. Some community bankers have complained that the government has focused too much on the biggest banks and paid too little attention to them as they struggle with the reverberations of Wall Street's crisis.

The US government has invested capital in the form of preferred stock in 300 small banks, although the vast majority of Tarp money has gone to the country's largest financial institutions.

A number of those large banks have said they intend to pay back Tarp funds, including Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Capital One Financial.

Mr Geithner pointed to a drop in spreads for corporate bonds, lower risk premiums in interbank markets and cheaper default insurance on the biggest banks as evidence that fear in the financial system was abating. "These are all welcome signs, but the process of financial recovery and repair is going to take time."

Stressing that in future he wants small banks to be insulated from the risks taken on by bigger and more complex institutions, Mr Geithner said he would propose a fund to support systemically important financial institutions in times of crisis, backed by those companies themselves.

"Our judgment is that it needs to be a separate solution where the burden of funding . . . [is] borne by the large institutions in a level proportionate to their size," he said .

There was strong support in Congress for a comprehensive overhaul of financial regulation, which the administration wanted to capitalise on, he said. "We want to move while the memory of the damage of the crisis is still acute."

He singled out the lightly regulated derivatives markets as one area that would need to be brought under tighter control.

US sovereign credit rating AAA is at risk

How can one justify bestowing a triple A rating on an entity with an accumulated negative net worth of more than $11,000bn (€8,000bn, £7,000bn) and additional off-balance sheet obligations of $45,000bn? An entity that is set to run a $1,800bn-plus deficit for the current year and trillion dollar-plus deficits for years to come?

America’s triple A rating is at risk

By David Walker

Published: May 12 2009 20:06 | Last updated: May 12 2009 20:06

Long before the current financial crisis, nearly two years ago, a little-noticed cloud darkened the horizon for the US government. It was ignored. But now that shadow, in the form of a warning from a top credit rating agency that the nation risked losing its triple A rating if it did not start putting its finances in order, is coming back to haunt us.

That warning from Moody’s focused on the exploding healthcare and Social Security costs that threaten to engulf the federal government in debt over coming decades. The facts show we’re in even worse shape now, and there are signs that confidence in America’s ability to control its finances is eroding.

Prices have risen on credit default insurance on US government bonds, meaning it costs investors more to protect their investment in Treasury bonds against default than before the crisis hit. It even, briefly, cost more to buy protection on US government debt than on debt issued by McDonald’s. Another warning sign has come from across the Pacific, where the Chinese premier and the head of the People’s Bank of China have expressed concern about America’s longer-term credit worthiness and the value of the dollar.

The US, despite the downturn, has the resources, expertise and resilience to restore its economy and meet its obligations. Moreover, many of the trillions of dollars recently funnelled into the financial system will hopefully rescue it and stimulate our economy.

The US government has had a triple A credit rating since 1917, but it is unclear how long this will continue to be the case. In my view, either one of two developments could be enough to cause us to lose our top rating.

First, while comprehensive healthcare reform is needed, it must not further harm our nation’s financial condition. Doing so would send a signal that fiscal prudence is being ignored in the drive to meet societal wants, further mortgaging the country’s future.

Second, failure by the federal government to create a process that would enable tough spending, tax and budget control choices to be made after we turn the corner on the economy would send a signal that our political system is not up to the task of addressing the large, known and growing structural imbalances confronting us.

For too long, the US has delayed making the tough but necessary choices needed to reverse its deteriorating financial condition. One could even argue that our government does not deserve a triple A credit rating based on our current financial condition, structural fiscal imbalances and political stalemate. The credit rating agencies have been wildly wrong before, not least with mortgage-backed securities.

How can one justify bestowing a triple A rating on an entity with an accumulated negative net worth of more than $11,000bn (€8,000bn, £7,000bn) and additional off-balance sheet obligations of $45,000bn? An entity that is set to run a $1,800bn-plus deficit for the current year and trillion dollar-plus deficits for years to come?

I have fought on the front lines of the war for fiscal responsibility for almost six years. We should have been more wary of tax cuts in 2001 without matching spending cuts that would have prevented the budget going deeply into deficit. That mistake was compounded in 2003, when President George W. Bush proposed expanding Medicare to include a prescription drug benefit. We must learn from past mistakes.

Fiscal irresponsibility comes in two primary forms – acts of commission and of omission. Both are in danger of undermining our future.

First, Washington is about to embark on another major healthcare reform debate, this time over the need for comprehensive healthcare reform. The debate is driven, in large part, by the recognition that healthcare costs are the single largest contributor to our nation’s fiscal imbalance. It also recognises that the US is the only large industrialised nation without some level of guaranteed health coverage.

There is no question that this nation needs to pursue comprehensive healthcare reform that should address the important dimensions of coverage, cost, quality and personal responsibility. But while comprehensive reform is called for and some basic level of universal coverage is appropriate, it is critically important that we not shoot ourselves again. Comprehensive healthcare reform should significantly reduce the huge unfunded healthcare promises we already have (over $36,000bn for Medicare alone as of last September), as well as the large and growing structural deficits that threaten our future.

One way out of these problems is for the president and Congress to create a “fiscal future commission” where everything is on the table, including budget controls, entitlement programme reforms and tax increases. This commission should venture beyond Washington’s Beltway to engage the American people, using digital technologies in an unparalleled manner. If it can achieve a predetermined super-majority vote on a package of recommendations, they should be guaranteed a vote in Congress.

Recent research conducted for the Peterson Foundation shows that 90 per cent of Americans want the federal government to put its own financial house in order. It also shows that the public supports the creation of a fiscal commission by a two-to-one margin. Yet Washington still sleeps, and it is clear that we cannot count on politicians to make tough transformational changes on multiple fronts using the regular legislative process. We have to act before we face a much larger economic crisis. Let’s not wait until a credit rating downgrade. The time for Washington to wake up is now.

David Walker is chief executive of the Peter G. Peterson Foundation and former comptroller general of the US

The shadow banking world's implosion is the real culprit

By Gillian Tett

Published: April 24 2009 03:00 | Last updated: April 24 2009 03:00

These days, banker-bashing is a popular sport for politicians of all stripes. For not only are the banks being blamed for unleashing financial disaster - while paying the bankers fat bonuses - they are also being blamed for slashing loans in a way that is now triggering a recession.

But is that perception really right? If you take a look at some recent research produced by Citigroup, it might seem not. For if Citi data are correct, the real source of the current credit crunch is not a collapse in bank loans, but the implosion of the shadow banking world.

And that in turn provokes a wider question: namely whether there is anything that policymakers could, or should, be doing now to revive the activities that were once performed by those peculiar shadow banks.

The numbers highlight the scale of the challenge. According to Citi (which has crunched its own figures and those of Dealogic), almost $1,500bn worth of new corporate loans were issued across the global financial system in 2008. That was well down from 2007, when over $2,000bn of loans were made.

But the loan total last year was similar to what was seen in 2006, and twice the scale of activity in 2004. Moreover, when non-financial loans are measured, an even more notable pattern crops up: at the end of last year, the volume of non-financial corporate loans was still growing at an annual rate of 10 per cent in both the US and Europe. That was well below the 20 per cent expansion seen in Europe before the peak of the boom, and in some sectors new bank-lending has tumbled. But those figures do not point to a credit drought. After all, from 2002-2004, loans to non-financial companies in the US shrank at an annual rate of more than 5 per cent.

What is imploding though is the securitisation world. If you exclude agencybacked bonds, in 2006 banks issued about $1,800bn of securities backed by mortgages, credit cards and other debts. Last year, though, a mere $200bn of bonds were sold in markets, and this year market issuance is minimal.

Indeed, the only group really acquiring repackaged debt now are western central banks, which have taken huge volumes of securities on to their own books (and away from the market), as part of their liquidity-injection measures.

So far this pattern has prompted relatively little wider political debate. After all, before the summer of 2007, most non-bankers had no idea that a shadow banking world even existed.

But the longer that this drought continues, the bigger the policy issues become. After all, no politician wants to see the government buying mortgage-backed bonds forever; but nobody really believes that traditional, old-fashioned lending can take up all the slack. So either the system needs to find a way to restart securitisation or we face a world where credit will remain a highly rationed commodity for a long time to come.

Is there any answer? This week the UK government made one attempt to break the impasse by unveiling a scheme to provide state guarantees for some mortgagebacked bonds (the idea, as my colleague Paul J Davies explains on the next page, is to prod the banks into repackaging such debt again). In America, officials are playing around with similar ideas. One concept being mooted, for example, is that the FDIC should help troubled banks securitise a swathe of assets.

On both sides of the Atlantic, industry leaders are also drawing up plans to make the securitisation process much more transparent, and thus, hopefully, more credible to future investors. Another idea is to impose a so-called "5 per cent rule". This would force banks that issue securities to retain at least 5 per cent of them on their own books, to ensure they have a vested interest in monitoring the creditworthiness of end borrowers.

On paper many of those ideas look sensible. And if they are all implemented, they might eventually enable the securitisation market to return to life, albeit on a more sober scale. But "eventually" is the key word here: right now, most parts of the securitisation market are all but dead. The longer that politicians wail about the supposed "failure of banks to lend", while ignoring the bigger source of the credit crunch, the harder it will be to wean the system away from government support.

Stress Test: Obama's conservatism

The conclusions are three: first, the government’s exercise is more conservative on losses than that of the IMF, albeit far less so than Mr Roubini’s; second, most of the capital to be raised will come from the earnings of a banking system able to borrow on the favourable terms arranged by the central bank and then to lend more expensively to its customers; and third, the target capital ratios – Tier 1 risk-weighted capital of 6 per cent of assets and Tier 1 common equity capital of 4 per cent – are not especially onerous.

Gillian's "implosion of shadow banking system": Commercial banks provide only a quarter of financial sector credit in the US, down from close to 40 per cent in the mid-1970s (see chart). Much of the rest came from various forms of securitisation. Unless and until the latter markets reopen fully, private sector credit is likely to be constrained. How far that constraint is binding depends on how far highly leveraged borrowers are willing to borrow, particularly when the collateral against which they borrow has lost value. For this reason, it is the huge stimulus – the least conservative parts of the economic package – that will deliver the recovery. These are also the least upsetting to the interests of powerful lobbies, particularly in finance.

More radical approaches – allowing more banks to default, for example – would have increased uncertainty in the short run and so undermined the return to stability Mr Obama craves. But here the president must reckon on a longer-term danger: that the rescued financial system will, in time, start to lay the foundations for another and possibly still bigger financial crisis in the years ahead.

Obama’s conservatism may not prove good enough

By Martin Wolf

Published: May 12 2009 19:56 | Last updated: May 12 2009 19:56

Pinn illustration

“If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.” Thus wrote the Sicilian writer Giuseppe di Lampedusa, in The Leopard. This seems to me the guiding principle of the Obama presidency. To many Americans, he seems a flaming radical. To me, he is a pragmatic conservative, albeit one responding to extraordinary times. In his own way, Mr Obama is following the path trodden by Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

Nowhere is his conservatism more obvious than in the handling of the economic crisis. What we have seen unfolding, from the president’s choice of Lawrence Summers and Tim Geithner as his principal policy advisers, to last week’s “stress tests”, is classic conservative policymaking. The aim is simply to get the show back on the road. As Mr Obama told The New York Times: “I’m absolutely committed to making sure that our financial system is stable.” Stability is a quintessentially conservative aim. Many radicals on the right and left insist that undercapitalised banks should be recapitalised right now. But Mr Obama sees this as far too risky.

The results of the stress tests were a big step along the road the administration is taking. They impose enough pain to appear credible, but not enough to be disruptive. The 10 affected banks will easily raise the needed money: a total of $75bn (€55bn, £59bn). Their market valuations duly soared.

Douglas Elliott of the Brookings Institution has provided a comparative analysis of how the US regulators reached their conclusions.* He contrasts their numbers with those of the International Monetary Fund, in its latest Global Financial Stability Report, and Nouriel Roubini of RGE Monitor and New York University. He also allows for the fact that the IMF and Mr Roubini look at all losses in US banking, while the tests apply to 19 institutions that hold some 70 per cent of US banking assets.

Estimated losses for 2009 and 2010 by the US regulators, the IMF and Mr Roubini are $535bn, $321bn and $811bn, respectively. So regulators were noticeably more risk-aware than the IMF, albeit less so than Mr Roubini. Against these losses are set the expected earnings (after dividends) over these years, plus a provision for 2011 losses. Here the regulators estimate earnings at $363bn, against an assumed $210bn for the IMF and Mr Roubini. This means the reduction in capital is estimated at $172bn by the regulators, $111bn by the IMF and $601bn by Mr Roubini. But, after allowing for planned capital-raising and excess earnings in the first quarter of 2009, the final reduction in capital is just $62bn for the regulators and a mere $1bn for the IMF, but as much as $491bn for Mr Roubini.

There are two important numbers in the above analysis: possible losses, and the buoyancy of earnings. Yet there is a final number of no less significance: how much capital does a bank need? The answer is: how long is a piece of string? Since many of these banks are deemed too big to fail, taxpayers are risk-bearers of last resort. The capital requirement depends partly on how well the government wants to be cushioned against possible losses and partly on how well bond-holders want to be insured against the possibility that government might refuse a rescue.

US banking

At the end of 2008, the ratio of total common equity to US banking assets was 3.7 per cent. Without the explicit and implicit insurance provided by government, it would surely have been higher. As the IMF notes, in the mid-1990s, before the leverage boom, the ratio was 6 per cent. In the 19th century, before deposit insurance, it was much higher still.

The conclusions are three: first, the government’s exercise is more conservative on losses than that of the IMF, albeit far less so than Mr Roubini’s; second, most of the capital to be raised will come from the earnings of a banking system able to borrow on the favourable terms arranged by the central bank and then to lend more expensively to its customers; and third, the target capital ratios – Tier 1 risk-weighted capital of 6 per cent of assets and Tier 1 common equity capital of 4 per cent – are not especially onerous.

The purpose of the exercise was indeed conservative: to make it credible, though not certain, that the existing banking system and assets can survive the likely battering. This has been done well enough to satisfy the markets. But these banks will also be unable to expand their balance sheet significantly in the near future.

The biggest question is how far this exercise will help restore the economy. Commercial banks provide only a quarter of financial sector credit in the US, down from close to 40 per cent in the mid-1970s (see chart). Much of the rest came from various forms of securitisation. Unless and until the latter markets reopen fully, private sector credit is likely to be constrained. How far that constraint is binding depends on how far highly leveraged borrowers are willing to borrow, particularly when the collateral against which they borrow has lost value. For this reason, it is the huge stimulus – the least conservative parts of the economic package – that will deliver the recovery. These are also the least upsetting to the interests of powerful lobbies, particularly in finance.

More radical approaches – allowing more banks to default, for example – would have increased uncertainty in the short run and so undermined the return to stability Mr Obama craves. But here the president must reckon on a longer-term danger: that the rescued financial system will, in time, start to lay the foundations for another and possibly still bigger financial crisis in the years ahead.

Ensuring the rescue of a financial system packed even more than before with complex and “too-big-to-fail” institutions may well be the cautious response to this crisis. But it leaves the government with the even more onerous task of imposing effective regulation in future. Unhappily, the record of regulation of generously insured financial systems is extremely poor. The mobilised self-interest of highly rewarded players easily overwhelms the constraints imposed by far less well-rewarded and almost certainly less able regulators.

The more the crisis unfolds, the more evident it is that incentives in the financial system were (and are) badly distorted. I sympathise with the conservative approach to crises, but not if it leaves in place the plethora of perverse incentives that created them. At the end of this, then, there will be one big test: will the number of institutions thought “too big to fail” be as large as now and, if so, how will they be controlled? If the answers are still not clear, there will need to be yet more change.

Tuesday, May 12, 2009

Risk-free Treasury: Mispricing risk premium?

The Risk of Debt

12 May 2009 07:55 am

So why should we worry about the ability of the government to borrow?  For the past decade, at least, the American government has been able to borrow pretty much all the money it wanted without seeming to pay much of a price in terms of higher interest rates.  Bush's deficits were worrying in a number of ways, but they certainly didn't crowd out private investments, and we got a good deal on the money.

But Obama's spending plans are extraordinarily ambitious.  His projected deficits for the rest of his possibly presidency are higher than the "runaway" deficits that plagued most of the Bush administration--and after the first few years, that's not stimulus, that's ordinary spending outstripping revenue.  For a while now, I've been asking people at conferences, on and off the record, what America's sovereign debt risk is?  That is, how long until people stop treating treasuries as the "risk free" securities, and start demanding a premium for the risk that we might default.

The answer from the right has been a nervous (perhaps hopeful) 2-3 years.  The answer from the left, and professional Democratic wonks, is some unspecified time in the future.  Probably, there will be a Republican in charge.  Markets hate Republicans.

But last Thursday, the Treasury auction was . . . well, descriptions vary from "weak" to "horrible".  This raises the unpleasant possibility that markets are, as my business school professors insisted, "forward looking".  Voters may believe that getting a bunch of special interests to agree in principal that costs should be cut is the same thing as actually cutting costs.  Bond markets don't.  That's why James Carville famously wanted to be reincarnated as the bond markets so he could "intimidate everyone". 

But the problems faced by Clinton were modest--moderately higher interest rates, possibly, for ordinary borrowers.  The Obama administration is trying to borrow 13% of GDP this year.  If bond markets think future deficits are a problem, they can rapidly push up rates to the point where that borrowing becomes unaffordable.  And if they do, it will be clear that they are pricing in that ugly, ugly CBO graph:

 

Obama can assure voters that he inherited these deficits.  But bond markets pay closer attention to the fact that Obama has already increased the projected deficit he inherited by 50%:

The White House raised the 2009 budget deficit projection to a staggering $1.8 trillion today. For context, it took President Bush more than seven years to accumulate $1.8 trillion in debt. It also means that 45 cents of every dollar Washington spends this year will be borrowed.

President Obama continues to distance himself from this "inherited" budget deficit. But the day he was inaugurated, the 2009 deficit was forecast at $1.2 trillion -- meaning $600 billion has already been added during his four-month presidency (an amount that, by itself, would exceed all 2001-07 annual budget deficits). And should the president really be allowed to distance himself from the $1.2 trillion "inherited" portion of the deficit, given that as a senator he supported nearly all policies and bailouts that created it?

The president also talks of cutting the deficit in half from this bloated level. But even after the recession ends and the troops return home, he'd still run $1 trillion deficits -- compared to President Bush's $162 billion pre-recession deficit. In other words, the structural budget deficit (which excludes the impacts of booms/recessions) would more than quintuple.

Obama's spending is not the only reason the deficits are so big--not by a long shot.  But he is using the sticker shock to slide in big spending plans without paying for them.  And while the US can certainly afford one $1.4 trillion year, it probably cannot afford 10 $600+ billion years.  As private credit markets recover, government credit markets will start to reflect that reality.

That's not to say that disaster is at hand.  Obviously, I am not fond of all the new spending plans, so I (and you) should be mindful of a possible tendency towards wishful thinking.  And this is early days--sometimes a bad bond auction is just a bad bond auction.  But I imagine that Larry Summers had at least one sleepless night.